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Abstract
We model the idea that when consumers search for products, they rst visit the
rm whose advertising is more salient. The gains a rm derives from being visited
early increase in search costs, so equilibrium advertising increases as search costs
rise. This may result in lower rm prots when search costs increase. We extend
the basic model by allowing for rm heterogeneity in advertising costs. Firms whose
advertising is more salient and therefore raise attention more easily charge lower
prices in equilibrium and obtain higher prots. As advertising cost asymmetries
increase, aggregate prots increase, advertising falls and welfare increases.
JEL Classication Numbers: D83, L13, M37.
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11 Introduction
Advertising is an important part of economic activity. In the US, for example, advertis-
ing expenditures constitute around 2.2% of GDP. According to PriceWaterhouseCoopers
worldwide advertising in 2005 amounted to a staggering $385 billion (PriceWaterhouse-
Coopers, 2005). This amount is set to grow to over half-a-trillion dollars in 2010. The
average American citizen is exposed to hundreds of commercial messages each day.1 Not
surprisingly, very few of these messages are able to get through the clutter and raise the
attention of consumers.2
A signicant part of the empirical marketing literature on advertising focuses on the
idea that the primary challenge for an advertising rm is to raise attention in the rst place.
Given the (increasing) number of commercial messages that consumers are confronted with
every day, the main role of advertising is to create rm saliency, that is, the prominence
of a brand in consumers' memories. Enhancing the salience of a brand requires ne-tuning
on a number of marketing variables. For example, Keller et al. (1998) examine the eects
of \suggestive" brand names on saliency;3 Unnava and Burnkrant (1991) study the eects
of advertising repetition on brand name memorability;4 nally, Burke and Srull (1988)
and Alba and Chattopadhyay (1986) study the existence of saliency enhancing advertising
externalities and point out that investments in \salience" of one rm inhibit the recall of
alternative rms.
Economists have also spent quite some eort in trying to understand the role of adver-
tising in product markets (for a survey, see Bagwell, 2007). One branch of the literature
1Estimates of this number vary widely (see e.g. http://www.hhcc.com/?p=468 for a discussion). In
1972, Britt et al. (1972) already nd between 300 and 600 messages per day. Arens et al. (2007), a popular
textbook, even claims that "as a consumer, you are exposed to hundreds and maybe even thousands of
commercial messages every day" (pg. 6).
2Franz (1986), for example, reports that out of more than 13,000 individuals questioned in 1985 about
the advertisements that were seen, heard or read in the past 30 days, 53 % were unable to remember any
specic one.
3They report evidence that product/brand names explicitly conveying a product benet or characteristic
may increase the recall probability of consumers interested in those characteristics. The name of the
motorcycle Triumph Speed Triple may be a good example; this motorcycle is probably recalled more
readily by consumers interested in speedy and agile motorbikes. Another example is Sharp televisions.
4See also Janiszewski et al. (2003), who investigate the relationship between brand rehearsal, advertising
repetition and advertising medium.
2considers advertising as a sunk cost rms incur to enhance consumers' willingness-to-pay
for their products. This has been coined persuasive advertising (see e.g. Braithwaite, 1928;
Kaldor, 1950; Galbraith, 1967). It typically enhances perceived product dierentiation and
thus softens competition. Since Telser (1964) and Nelson (1970, 1974), the view of adver-
tising as a device to transmit information has been gaining support. Through informative
advertising, rms can communicate, either directly or through signalling, their existence,
location, price, or quality. By increasing the information consumers possess, informative
advertising typically enhances competition.5
To the best of our knowledge, however, the economics literature has not examined the
in
uence of saliency enhancing advertising on economic outcomes.6 To close this gap, this
paper proposes a model in which the main role for the ads of a rm is to \compete" for
the \attention" of consumers. Products are dierentiated, and consumers search shops
sequentially to nd a product to their liking (see Wolinsky, 1986; Anderson and Renault,
1999). As search is costly, a consumer will stop searching if she nds a deal that is
suciently attractive and visiting more shops is not worth her while. It is thus in the
interest of a rm to be visited earlier than the rivals. However, it is hard for a rm to
stand out from the crowd, get the attention of consumers, and lure them to their shops (see
e.g. Comanor and Wilson, 1974). We assume that the order in which rms are sampled is
in
uenced by how much they advertise. More precisely, at every stage in the search process
the probability that a consumer recalls a shop and decides to visit it, is proportional to that
shop's share in total industry advertising. Thus, advertising helps a rm to become more
salient and to remind consumers of the kind of products it sells. Whenever a consumer
needs such a product, the rm hopes consumers will remember its shop more readily than
those of its rivals.7
5For advertising conveying direct information see e.g. Butters (1977), Shapiro (1980), Grossman and
Shapiro (1984), Stahl (1994) and Bester and Petrakis (1995). For advertising as a signal of quality see
Nelson (1974), Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984) and Milgrom and Roberts (1986).
6An exception is Anderson and de Palma (2008), who propose a model where advertising messages
vie for consumer attention. Their paper focuses on the existence of congested equilibria (i.e., equilibria
where more messages are sent that they are examined) and on the welfare eects of public policies such
as subsidies and do-not-call lists among others.
7In our model, advertising only provides information about the existence and location of shops, not
about prices. The idea is that consumers have limited memory and by the time they go to the market they
3We believe that this model provides a suitable framework to understand the eects
of search costs on advertising, prices and prots. It also provides a rationale as to why
consumers would increase their propensity to buy a product when they see it advertised,
without having to make the unsatisfactory assumption that advertising directly increases
willingness to pay, as is common in most models of persuasive advertising. Finally, the
model helps understand why there is so much advertising that conveys little information
about well-known horizontally dierentiated brands/products.
We nd that both price and advertising expenditures increase in search costs. As search
costs increase, consumers are more reluctant to visit several shops. A typical shop then
has more market power over each consumer that does pay a visit, hence it will charge a
higher price. At the same time, it becomes even more important for a rm to be salient
and to be visited early. Once a consumer visits a shop to inspect its product, she is
less likely to walk away to sample another shop. Hence rms will advertise more. The
eect of an increase in search costs on rm protability is ambiguous. If search costs are
relatively small, the price eect dominates and equilibrium prots increase when search
costs increase. However, when search costs are relatively high, the price eect is more
than oset by the rent-dissipation eect of increased advertising, so higher search costs
imply lower equilibrium prots. This is contrary to the received wisdom in the literature
on search costs (see e.g. the classic papers of Reinganum, 1979; Burdett and Judd, 1983
and Stahl, 1989). Our model thus provides an instance in which rms do not necessarily
benet from higher search costs. In fact, when search costs are large enough, we show that
rm prots can be lower than in a frictionless world with zero search costs.
In our basic model, rms nd themselves in a classic prisoners' dilemma. If a rm
advertised less than the rest of the rms, the chance that this rm is pushed to the end
of consumers search order would be higher. In equilibrium all rms advertise with the
same intensity which implies that consumers end up recalling each rm with the same
are simply unable to remember all the prices they have seen in advertisements. The best an advertiser
can hope for is that consumers remember its identity and/or its location. In any case, there are many
instances in which advertising prices is impractical. For example, when shops sell many products (like
fashion shops, electronics superstores, supermarkets, etc.) it is simply unfeasible to list the prices of all
products.
4probability. Firms would thus be better o if advertising were banned. From a welfare
point of view, advertising is purely wasteful.
To study the eect of asymmetries, we provide an extension with two rms where one
rm is more ecient in generating saliency than the other. We nd that the more ecient
rm advertises more and hence attracts a larger share of consumers on their rst visit. This
rm also charges a lower price. By choosing to visit a second rm, consumers reveal that
they do no particularly like the product the rst rm oered. Hence, such consumers are
less price-sensitive than consumers who still have the option to visit another shop. As the
less ecient rm's pool of visitors has a higher share of these less price-sensitive consumers,
it nds it protable to charge a higher price. Still, equilibrium prots of the more ecient
rm are higher. Advertising now has social value as it helps consumers to channel their
rst-visits towards better deals. As advertising cost asymmetries increase, more consumers
end up at the cheapest store rst, and fewer consumers incur the cost of searching both
rms. Nevertheless, total consumer surplus decreases because of the price increase of the
less ecient rm. Savings in advertising and search costs outweigh consumer losses and
overall welfare increases as advertising cost asymmetries rise.
As noted, we assume that the order in which rms are visited is in
uenced by advertising
eorts. In Horta csu and Syverson (2004), sampling probability variation across rms is
used to explain price dispersion in the mutual funds industry. The authors use advertising
outlays as one proxy for the sampling probability of a fund in the market. That is consistent
with our model. Most theoretical papers in the search literature assume that consumers
sample rms randomly.8 Exceptions include the following. In Arbatskaya (2007), the
order in which rms are visited is exogenously given. She nds that prices fall in the order
in which rms are visited: a consumer that walks away from a rm reveals that it has low
search costs, which gives the next rm an incentive to charge a lower price. In Wilson
(2008), a rm can choose the magnitude of the search cost consumers have to incur to visit
it. In equilibrium, consumers are more likely to rst visit rms with low search cost and
8See the seminal contributions of Rob (1985), B enabou (1993), Burdett and Judd (1983), Carlson and
McAfee (1983), Stahl (1989), Reinganum (1979) and Wolinsky (1986). More recent work includes Anderson
and Renault (1999), Janssen and Moraga-Gonz alez (2004, 2007), Janssen et al. (2005) and Rauh (2004,
2007).
5prices also fall in the search order. In our model rms sell dierentiated products which
implies that prices increase in the (expected) order in which they are sampled: a consumer
that walks away from a rm has fewer options left and is thus less price sensitive. Finally,
and more directly related to our specic model, Armstrong et al. (2009) study a search
market with dierentiated products where one rm is always visited rst, while the other
rms are sampled randomly if a consumer decides not to buy from the prominent rm. In
equilibrium, the prominent rm charges lower prices and has higher prots than the other
rms, for the same reason as in our analysis. Indeed, our model can be interpreted as one
in which rms invest in prominence but where prominence can only be imperfect.
Across industries, our model predicts a positive correlation between search costs, adver-
tising expenditures and prices. An industry with higher search costs is able to set higher
prices, but will also advertise more. Within an industry, we predict a negative correlation
between prices on the one hand, and advertising expenditures and market shares on the
other. Firms that are more ecient in generating saliency attract more consumers, set
lower prices and make higher prots. Other papers also predict a negative relationship
between advertising and prices, but for dierent reasons. In Robert and Stahl (1993) rms
can advertise prices on a search market with homogeneous products, and advertise lower
prices more intensively. In Bagwell and Ramey (1994) advertising is used as a coordination
device for rms to attract more consumers and hence have lower costs, allowing them to
charge lower prices. In our model, rms that advertise more attract a pool of consumers
that is more price sensitive, and therefore charge lower prices.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe the set-up
of the model. The equilibrium results for symmetric rms are derived in subsection 3, and
the results on the eects of search costs on advertising eorts, prices and prots are given
in subsection 3.3. Section 4 presents results for a market with asymmetric rms. Section
5 concludes.
62 The model
There are n rms that sell horizontally dierentiated products. Let N denote the set of
rms. Marginal costs are constant and normalized to zero. For simplicity and without
loss of generality we assume that there is one consumer. She has tastes described by an
indirect utility function
u
i(pi) = "i   pi;
if she buys product i at price pi: The parameter "i is a match value between the consumer
and product i: Match values are independently distributed across products. We assume
that "i is the realization of a random variable with distribution F and a continuously
dierentiable log-concave density f with support normalized to [0;1]: No rm can observe
"i so practising price discrimination is not feasible. The consumer only learns "i upon
visiting rm i. We denote the monopoly price by pm, i.e., pm = argmaxpfp(1   F(p))g.
The consumer must incur a search cost s in order to learn the price charged by rm
i as well as her match value "i for the product sold by that rm. The consumer searches
sequentially with costless recall. We assume that search cost s is relatively small so that
the rst search is always worthwhile, that is:








Firms engage in an advertising battle to lure consumers to their shops. In particular
we assume that at any moment during the search process, a consumer is more likely to go
to rm i if she has had more exposure to the ads of that rm (or if the ads of rm i have
happened to be relatively more salient than other rms' ads).9 The set-up of the model
ensures that the equilibrium does not have the consumer necessarily buying in the rst
shop she enters, as is the case in most search models. Therefore, it is important for rms
to be visited early, but it is not crucial for making a sale.
Let ai, i = 1;2;:::;n denote the number of advertisements of rm i. The cost of
9In the marketing and business literatures, the ease with which a brand/shop comes to mind is referred
to as \top-of-mind awareness" (see e.g. Kotler, 2000).
7producing ai advertisements is i(ai); with 0
i > 0 and 00
i  0: 10 Given an advertising
strategy prole (a1;a2;:::;an), suppose that the consumer has already visited v rms. Let
V be the set of visited rms. We assume that the probability that she will recall rm




This modelling of the recall probability captures the inhibition eects that own advertising
has on the recall of competing brands (cf. Burke and Srull (1988) and Alba and Chat-
topadhyay (1986)). For simplicity, we assume that a rm that does not advertise, will not
be visited and hence will not sell anything.
This modelling of the consumer recall process is similar to that in the rent-seeking
contest described by Tullock (1980).11 Intuitively, one can think of each advertisement of
a rm as a ball this rm puts in an urn. Each rm can put as many balls in the urn as it
likes. Whenever the consumer needs a product, she draws one ball from the urn and visits
the corresponding rm. If, after the rst visit, the consumer decides to visit another rm,
she proceeds in the same way: again draw a ball from the urn and visit the corresponding
rm provided it has not been visited yet; and so forth.12 We assume that the consumer
cannot observe the levels of advertising of rms, i.e. she does not observe how many balls
each rm has put in the urn. She only observes which ball she draws from the urn.
The timing in our model is as follows. First, rms simultaneously decide on advertising
and prices. Second, consumers sequentially search for a satisfactory deal following the
recall process described above. In Section 3.1 we focus on the case where all rms have
10Alternatively, we may assume that rms decide on the amount Ai to spend on advertising, while the
amount of ads of rm i is given by ai = i(Ai): It is easy to see that this specication yields the exact same
outcomes if we choose i() = 
 1
i (): The convexity of the advertising cost function is used only to ensure
equilibrium existence and uniqueness (cf. Proposition 1); the other results hold for linear advertising costs.
11Schmalensee (1976) uses a similar idea in the context of advertising, but in his model prices are
exogenously given. Horta csu and Syverson (2004), in their empirical study of price dispersion in the
mutual fund industry, also model the funds' sampling probabilities in a similar way. Chioveanu (2007)
also uses this type of advertising technology in the context of persuasive (loyalty-inducing) advertising in
a market for homogeneous products.
12See Skaperdas (1996) and Kooreman and Schoonbeek (1997) for axiomatizations of Tullock's contest
success function. An alternative formulation would be one where rms engage in an advertising race for
consumers' attention (akin to the patent race models in the R&D literature). The results in Baye and
Hoppe (2003) show that these two formulations are strategically equivalent.
8the same advertising technology i.e. where i = , i = 1;2;:::;n. In Section 4 we study a
market where rms dier in their advertising technologies.
3 Symmetric rms
3.1 Analysis
In this section we assume that all rms have the same advertising technology, denoted
by : We look for a symmetric Nash equilibrium. Consider rm i: Suppose that all rms
dierent from i charge price p and set advertising level a: A symmetric Nash equilibrium
then requires that the best reply for rm i is to also set (a;p): To calculate rm i's payo,
we need to take into account the order in which rms may be visited, and the probability
to make a sale conditional on being visited.
Suppose that the buyer approaches rm i in her rst search. This rm provides her
with net utility "i  pi. If "i  pi < 0, the consumer will search again. Suppose "i  pi  0.
A visit to some other rm j will yield "j   p. This is higher than the utility from buying
from rm i if "j > "i   ; with  = pi   p  0. If we dene x  "i   , the expected





An additional search is worthwhile if and only if these incremental benets exceed the cost
of search s. The buyer is exactly indierent between an additional search and accepting
the oer at hand if x  ^ x, with ^ x implicitly dened by
g(^ x) = s: (1)
The function g is monotonically decreasing. Moreover, g(0) =
R 1
0 "f(")d" and g(1) = 0.
It is readily seen that s <
R 1
0 "f(")d". Therefore, for any s 2 [0;s], there exists a unique
^ x 2 [pm;1] that solves (1).
Since any equilibrium necessarily has ^ x  p, the probability that a buyer stops search-
ing at rm i given that rm i is sampled, is equal to13
Pr[x > ^ x and "i > pi] = Pr[x > ^ x] = (1   F(^ x + )):
13This expression assumes that the deviation price pi is not too high, that is, 1   F(^ x + ) is strictly
9If we denote the probability that a consumer visits rm i in her rst search and buys there








ai + (n   1)a(1   F(^ x + )) (2)
Now consider the case that a consumer goes to rm i in her second search and then
decides to buy there. This implies that she has visited some other rm rst, say rm j, but
decided not to buy there. In the symmetric Nash equilibrium, whenever she walks away
from a rm, she expects price to be equal to p in the next shop. The probability that she
walks away from j is thus given by Pr["j < ^ x ] = F(^ x): If we denote by i
2(ai;pi;a;p) the
probability that rm i is visited in second place and the consumer decides to buy from i








ai + (n   1)a

ai
ai + (n   2)a

F(^ x)(1   F(^ x + )) (3)
where we have used the fact that the reservation value ^ x is the same no matter how many
rms the consumer has already been visited (see Kohn and Shavell, 1974). More generally,
the joint probability that a consumer visits rm i in her kth, k = 3;:::;n search and buys











ai + (n   `)aF(^ x)
k 1 [1   F(^ x + )]: (4)
There is a probability that the consumer initially decides to walk away from rm i only
to nd that, after having visited all rms in the industry, rm i oered the best deal after




f"jgg < ^ x and "i   pi > max
j6=i
f"j   p
g and "i > pi]








positive. Otherwise, no consumer would ever stop searching at rm i and, as a result, this rm would only
sell to consumers who happen to nd no acceptable product elsewhere. We come back to this issue in the
proof of Proposition 1.















It is important to note that this expression is only valid for p close enough to p; i.e. for
small deviations from the tentative equilibrium (see footnote 13). For large deviations such
that F(^ x + ) = 1 the prot function looks dierent as the consumer would then never
buy directly at rm i. We take this case into account in the proof of the next result.14
Proposition 1 If a symmetric Nash equilibrium exists, advertising levels and prices are

























1   F(^ x)n









Suppose that F represents the uniform distribution and that 00 is suciently large. Then
a symmetric equilibrium exists and is unique.
The proof of this result proceeds along the following lines. In step 1 we show that the
rst order conditions imply the expressions (7) and (8). In step 2, we show that a solution
to this system of equations exists, and that it is unique if for example the distribution
of match values is uniform. Such a solution is indeed a symmetric Nash equilibrium if a
rm cannot protably deviate when all other rms play (p;a): For general distributions
functions F, however, the expression piR(pi;p) may not be quasi-concave in pi and so
the prot i() may be maximized at a pair other than (p;a): Under log-concavity of
the density function f; the expression piR(pi;p) is quasi-concave in pi (see Caplin and
Nalebu, 1991) but this does not guarantee that i() is also quasi-concave in pi (since the
sum of quasi-concave functions need not be quasi-concave; see also Anderson and Renault,
1999). In step 3, we therefore focus on the case where F is the uniform distribution and
14Similarly, if a rm were to set an advertising eort arbitrarily close to zero, then the rm would
be visited last with a probability arbitrarily close to one and then the payo would be similar. In the
Appendix we show that these cases are not really problematic.
1100 is large. In that case, we show that the payo function i() is globally concave, so
the solution to the system of equations(7) and (8) is indeed the unique symmetric Nash
equilibrium. In step 4, we show that large deviations from (p;a), for which the prot
function (6) is no longer the relevant one, are not protable either.
3.2 Comparative Statics
Proposition 2 The comparative statics of the equilibrium described in Proposition 1 are
as follows:
1. An increase in the marginal cost of advertising has no eect on equilibrium prices p
and lowers the equilibrium number of ads a:
2. If the density of match values is non-decreasing, an increase in search costs s raises
equilibrium price p and raises the equilibrium number of ads a:
3. If match values are uniformly distributed, an increase in the number of rms n in-
creases per-rm advertising for n suciently low. In general, per-rm advertising
goes to zero as the number of rms approaches innity.
Since all rms advertise with the same intensity in a symmetric equilibrium, changes
in advertising costs have no eect on equilibrium prices; these are only aected by relative
dierences in advertising levels.15 Naturally, if advertising is more expensive, rms choose
to use less of it.
The result on the relationship between prices and search costs is similar to Anderson
and Renault (1999), who study a setting where the market is always fully covered in
equilibrium, in the sense that every consumer buys a product of one of the shops. Our
result extends theirs to a setting where industry demand is elastic. As search costs increase,
the probability that a consumer walks away from a rm to sample another one decreases.
This confers market power to rms that are visited and hence prices increase. The result
15The fact that advertising costs do not aect equilibrium prices is an artifact of the symmetry of
equilibrium. Later in Section 4 we show how lowering the advertising cost of a rm results in a fall in its
equilibrium price.
12on the relationship between search costs and advertising is novel. An increase in search
costs increases the market power of a rm that is visited. Hence it becomes more desirable
for a rm to attract that consumer. As a result, rms advertise with greater intensity as
search costs rise.
An increase in the number of rms has two eects on rms' incentive to advertise. First,
if there are more rms that put out ads, the marginal eectiveness of an additional ad of
rm i decreases. This lowers the incentive to advertise. Second, as the number of rms
increases, it becomes more important to attract a consumer early. This raises the incentive
to advertise. If the number of rms is small, the second eect dominates. With many
rms, the rst eect does. Figure 1 shows that advertising intensity is non-monotonic in
the number of rms for the uniform distribution case. Prices and prots of the rms also
decrease in n.
(a) Advertising intensity (b) Price
Figure 1: Price, advertising intensity and the number of rms
3.3 Prots and welfare
Search costs are generally seen as a boon to rms. As search costs increase, rms have
more market power, which leads to higher prots (see e.g. Reinganum, 1979; Burdett and
Judd, 1983; or Stahl, 1989). The following result however shows that that is not necessarily
true in our model.
13Proposition 3 Assume the advertising technology is linear. Then, the equilibrium eect
of search costs on rm prots is as follows:
1. For suciently small search costs s, prots increase in s:
2. For suciently large search costs s, prots may decrease in s and eventually fall below
the prots that rms would make in a frictionless world. In particular, this is true
with 2 rms and uniformly distributed matching values.
An increase in search costs s has two opposite eects on rm prots. With an increase
in s, rms gain market power over customers that pay them a visit, which allows them to
charge a higher price. This tends to increase prots. But this also implies that it becomes
more attractive for each individual rm to attract consumers, to invest in saliency and try
to beat its rivals in the battle for attention. As a result, rms spend more on advertising,
which tends to lower rm prots. In our model, advertising is a rent-seeking activity that
leads to a dissipation of the rents generated by greater market power. When search costs
are small, the price eect dominates and rms gain from an increase in search costs. When
search costs are large, the advertising eect may dominate and prots decrease with higher
search costs.16 Interestingly, we may even have an overdissipation of rents in the sense
rms spend more resources to capture the additional rents than those rents are actually
worth. This eect can become so severe that rms end up obtaining prots that are lower
than those in a world with zero search costs. In Figure 2 we plot equilibrium prots against
search costs. The dashed lines show the prots rms would make if advertising were banned
(a = 0), and the prots rms would make if search costs were zero (s = 0).
In our model, lowering search costs always increases welfare. If the market were fully
covered, total welfare would be maximized if investments in advertising were minimized.
From Proposition 3, we know this to be the case if search costs are zero. Since we consider
a case in which industry demand is not completely inelastic, this result is only reinforced,
16It can be shown that this is not only true in the case described in the Proposition. It can also be
shown to be true if the market is fully covered, as in Anderson and Renault (1999), or if the rst search
is costless, regardless of the number of rms and the distribution of matching values. Details are available
from the authors upon request.
14Figure 2: Equilibrium prots (n = 2, f = 1, (a) = a)
as lower search costs imply lower prices and hence a lower deadweight loss.17
Note that, in this model, rms nd themselves in a prisoners' dilemma. If a rm
advertised less than the rest, the chance that this rm is pushed to the end of consumers
search order would be higher. In equilibrium all rms advertise with the same intensity,
which implies that consumers end up recalling each rm with the same probability. Firms
would thus be better o if advertising were banned, while consumers would not be aected.
From a welfare point of view, advertising is purely wasteful. That is no longer true if we
extend the model to allow for asymmetric advertising technologies. In that case, the
equilibrium will see one rm advertising more than the other. This implies that one rm
is more likely to be visited than the other, which in turn aects rms' pricing incentives.
We study this case in the next section.
4 Asymmetric rms
4.1 Introduction
The analysis in the previous section has ex-ante symmetric rms. This implies that in
equilibrium all rms that have not yet been visited by a given consumer, are always equally
17Interestingly, when search costs are suciently high, it would even be a Pareto improvement to have
lower search costs. Consumers are better o as equilibrium prices decrease, while rms are better o as
equilibrium prots increase. Of course, here we are not taking into consideration the advertising industry.
If we did, advertisers would lose as search costs fall (advertising expenditures are just transfers from the
product market to the advertising industry).
15likely to be visited next. Yet, it would be interesting to see how results are aected if rms
are no longer symmetric. Do rms that attract more consumers charge higher or lower
prices? More specically, is higher advertising correlated with higher prices, or with lower
ones? How are consumer welfare and rm prots aected if consumers overwhelmingly
visit rms in the same order? We address such questions in this section.
To generate asymmetries between rms, we assume that they dier in their advertising
technology: for some exogenous reason, one rm is able to raise awareness at lower costs
than the other, for example because it runs a more eective advertising campaign, has a
more memorable shop's name, or has a higher stock of advertising goodwill inherited from
the past.18 Technically, we assume that advertising cost  diers between rms, so we
write i(ai); i 2 f1;2g. Moreover, we assume that this is common knowledge.19 It turns
out that introducing asymmetries greatly complicates the analysis. We therefore have to
restrict ourselves to a setting with 2 rms and a uniform distribution of matching values.
Even that simple set-up does not allow us to always nd analytical results, so we will partly
have to resort to a numerical analysis.
One complication has to do with consumer search behavior. Suppose that the equi-
librium has one rm charging a low price and one rm charging a high price. Consumers
know which prices are set in equilibrium. Suppose moreover that a consumer observes an
out-of-equilibrium price at her rst visit. Her decision whether to continue searching will
then be aected by whether she interprets this out-of-equilibrium price as coming from the
low-priced rm or from the high-priced rm. One way to circumvent such complication is
to assume that, upon visiting a rm, a consumer can observe its advertising technology.20
18Admittedly, there are alternative ways to introduce asymmetries across rms, for example the rms
could have dierent marginal costs of production or oer dierent quality levels. We have chosen dierences
in advertising costs because in the absence of advertising the equilibrium is still symmetric; this allows us
to focus on a case where the asymmetry in equilibrium prices stems only from dierences in advertising
levels.
19To retain a priori symmetry between rms, we could have assumed that the parameters of each rm's
advertising technology are drawn from the same probability density function H(). Yet, even in the
simplest case of a linear advertising technology, solving for equilibrium advertising levels would then boil
down to solving a rent-seeking game between players that have private information about their costs, which
is impossible to do. See Fey (2008) for an extensive analysis of such a game.
20For example, from observing the lay-out and the colours in the store, she may realize that she has
actually seen more ads from the other store and hence this store must be the one with the more costly
advertising technology.
16Alternatively, we can invoke an argument akin to Cho and Kreps' (1987) intuitive criterion
to argue that for a consumer it is reasonable to believe that a deviation comes always from
the high-priced rm.21
4.2 Analysis
Let ! 2 f1;2;12;21g denote which rms a particular consumer visits, and in what order.
Thus ! = 12 implies that the consumer has rst visited rm 1, and then rm 2. Let q!
i
denote total demand for rm i from such consumers. Thus q12
1 denotes demand for rm
1 from consumers that visit rm 1 and 2 in that order, while q1
1 denotes demand for rm





strategy prole of the rms. In general, to study whether (a
i;p
i) is a best reply to (a
j;p
j);












where we have suppressed the arguments of the demand functions for ease of exposition. To
evaluate these prots, we rst have to derive the relevant demand functions. Consider qi
i:
Suppose a buyer approaches i in her rst search. This occurs with probability ai=(ai+a
j):
She then observes "i and pi: In equilibrium, she knows that a visit to j will yield utility
"j   p
j. She benets from such a visit whenever "j > "i   (pi   p
j)  xi: Hence, her
expected benet is
R 1
xi("   xi)f(")d": Recall that ^ x is the solution to
R 1
^ x("   ^ x)f(")d" = s.
The probability that this consumer immediately buys from rm i then equals22 Pr[xi >
21This requires that the consumer attaches zero probability to the event that an out-of-equilibrium
action comes from a player that cannot possibly benet from such a deviation. Suppose that equilibrium
prices derived under the assumption that consumers learn the true type of both rms upon visiting one




2: From the point of view of the rms, the most favorable out-
of-equilibrium belief a consumer can have is that the defecting rm is the low-priced rm for sure: with
that belief, she is least likely to walk away as she believes the other rm to be more expensive. But even if
the consumer has such beliefs, the low-priced rm is never willing to defect from p
2; since this equilibrium
price has already been derived under the assumption that the consumer believes this to be the low-priced
rm. Hence, a defection from p
2 can never be protable for rm 2. This implies that any defection will be
interpreted as coming from the high-priced rm, which in turn implies that this rm never has an incentive
to deviate from p
1.
22Note that again, we must have ^ x > p
2, which implies that this probability is well-dened. We also
assume that ^ x + pi   p
j 2 (0;1): In equilibrium, this is indeed the case.
17^ x] = 1   F(^ x + pi   p
















ects a consumer that visits i rst and nds an acceptable deal there, then
decides to also visit j, only to nd that j provides her with a worse deal than i. Conditional
on visiting i rst, the probability of this occurring is Pr[xi < ^ x and "i   pi > "j   p
j and










("i   pi + p

j)d"i: (11)
Consider the consumer that visits j rst. She observes a deal giving her utility "j  p
j. At
rm i, this consumer expects to see a price equal to p
i. If we dene x
j  "j   p
j + p
i, the
probability she also visits i is Pr[x
j < ^ x]. Conditional on visiting j rst, the probability
that a consumer buys from i therefore is Pr[x
j < ^ x and "i  pi > "j  p
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Taking the rst order conditions with respect to own advertising intensity and price, and
imposing pi = p
i and ai = a
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18Writing the conditions (13) and (14) for i = 1;2 and j 6= i yields four nonlinear equalities
that can be solved to nd equilibrium advertising levels and prices. From these rst-order
conditions, we can prove the following results:
Proposition 4 With 2 rms, a uniform distribution of matching values, and asymmetric
advertising technologies, we have that the rm that advertises more, sets a lower price:
a
i > a
j necessarily implies p
i < p
j;
This result can be understood as follows. By choosing to visit a second rm, consumers
reveal that they do no particularly like the product the rst rm oered. Hence, such
consumers are less price-sensitive than consumers who still have the option to visit an-
other shop. The rm with less advertising has a higher share of these less price-sensitive
consumers. Therefore, it nds it protable to charge a higher price. This result is in line
with the study of Armstrong et al. (2009) on prominence. In their paper one rm, the
prominent one, is visited rst for sure. Should the consumer decide to sample more rms,
she does so at random. This corresponds to the case in our model with advertising levels
exogenously set to a
1 > 0 and a
2 = 0.
4.3 Linear advertising technologies
To put additional structure on the model, we assume that advertising technologies are
linear, so i(a) = ia: Moreover, we assume that rm 1 is more advertising-ecient than
rm 2, in the sense that raising additional awareness is always cheaper for rm 1 than it
is for rm 2, so 1 < 2: It is then easy to show that rm 1 will advertise more:
Proposition 5 In equilibrium, the more advertising-ecient rm will advertise more.
4.4 Numerical analysis
To do comparative statics we have to resort to a numerical analysis. We again assume
linear advertising technologies. Without loss of generality, we assume that rm 1 has the
more ecient advertising technology, and normalize 2 to 1; so 1  2 < 1: From the





19parameter   1 now re
ects the extent of asymmetry between advertising technologies:
as  increases, advertising technologies become more symmetric.
(a) Price (b) Advertising intensity
Figure 3: Price, advertising intensity and the number of rms
In Figure 3 we depict equilibrium prices and advertising levels as a function of : For
the level of search costs, we have chosen s = 0:08; but changing this value does not aect
these graphs qualitatively.
Result 1 With 2 rms, a uniform distribution of matching values, linear advertising tech-
nologies, and rm 1 the more advertising-ecient rm, we have the following:
1. if we denote by (a
s;p
s) equilibrium advertising levels and prices in case of equal




2. an increase in the asymmetry in rm advertising eciency has the following eects:
(a) the price of the cheapest rm decreases, that of the most expensive rm increases,
while average prices also increase;
(b) the advertising level of the cheapest rm increases, that of the most expensive
rm decreases, while average advertising levels also increase.
20The rst result conrms the intuition behind Proposition 4: the cheaper rm also
charges a lower price than what it charges with equal advertising, while the more expensive
rm charges a price that is also higher than what it charges with equal advertising. Result
2a shows that the price gap becomes more pronounced as the dierence in equilibrium
advertising levels increases. Result 2b implies that, as the asymmetry in rm advertising
costs increases, the dierence in advertising eorts will also increase.
Note that a rm that advertises more, is more likely to be visited rst by a consumer.
As she knows that this rm charges a lower price than the other rm, she is also less likely
to walk away from this rm. This suggests that the number of equilibrium searches will
be lower when there is more asymmetry between advertising levels of the two rms. The
following result establishes that this is indeed the case.23
Result 2 With 2 rms, a uniform distribution of matching values, and linear advertising
technologies, we have that the number of searches, and hence total search costs incurred by
consumers, decreases as the asymmetry in advertising levels increases.
Hence, advertising now has social value as it helps consumers to channel their rst-visits
towards better deals.
4.5 Welfare
Consumer welfare will depend on where a consumer buys, and which rms she visits. In
Figure 4, we have depicted this in ("1;"2)-space. The left-hand panel gives the analysis for
23If we take the results in Result 1 as given, we can also establish this result formally. By construction,
each consumer searches at least once for sure. If she visits i rst, the probability of a second search
is F
 




. If she visits j rst, the probability of a second search is F
 













: We can write the expected number of searches as
E(searches) = 1 + 
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The results in Proposition 1 imply that @p
2=@
 > 0 and @p
1=@
























Hence the number of searches decreases as 
 increases, that is, if the asymmetry between equilibrium
advertising levels increases.
21consumers that rst visit rm 1, the right-hand panel re
ects consumers that rst visit rm
2. In the left-hand panel, the dark-shaded area re
ects the consumers that immediately
buy from 1. Consumers in the vertically dashed area also buy from 1 { but only after
having visited both rms. Consumers in the horizontally dashed area buy from 2 after
having visited both rms. Consumers in the white bottom-left corner do not buy at all.
(a) First visit rm 1 (b) First visit rm 2
Figure 4: Consumer purchasing behavior
In the right-hand panel, consumers in the vertically dashed area again buy from 1, and
consumers in the horizontally dashed area from 2, both after having visited both rms.
Consumers in the lightly shaded area buy from 2, consumers in the white area do not buy
at all.
Consider an increase in advertising asymmetry. The rst eect of this is that total
advertising of rm 1 increases, hence the left-hand panel of rm 1 will become relevant
for more consumers. This eect is benecial for consumer welfare, as more consumers now
visit the cheaper rm rst. Next, p
1 decreases while p
2 increases. This implies for the
left-hand panel that the lines "1 = p
1 and "1 = ^ x + p
1   p
2 move to the left, while the
lines "2 = "1 + p
2   p
1 and "1 = p
2 move upwards. Consumers that already bought from
221, or switch their choice to 1, benet. The total number of searches decreases. Consumers
that still buy from 2, however, are hurt, while numerical simulations show that the total
number of non-buyers also increases. The eects in the right-hand panel are similar.
In sum, as asymmetry between advertising technologies increases (so 1 decreases), the
price of 1 decreases while that of 2 increases. The rst eect is good news for consumers,
also as they visit 1 more frequently than 2. However, as 2's price is higher, consumers who
fail to nd a satisfactory product at 1 are forced to accept a (much) higher price more
often. On average consumers search less, which lowers their search costs but also makes
them less exposed to variety. The total number of consumers who buy decreases, which
is obviously a source of ineciency. The aggregate eect on consumer welfare is therefore
complex.
To calculate consumer surplus, we use the same notation as above: we let ! 2 f1;2;12;21g
denote which rms a consumer has visited, and in what order. Thus ! = 12 implies that
this consumer has rst visited rm 1, and then rm 2. Let CS!
i denote the total surplus
of such consumers who buy from rm i. Consider, for example, consumers that buy from i
that have only visited i. These consumers each incur total search costs s: Their net surplus
thus is "i   p













































































and total welfare is W = CS + 
1 + 
2 as usual.
To fully appreciate the eect of a change in  on welfare, we have to resort to numerical
analysis. In gure 5, we depict the components of total welfare equilibrium prots of rm
23Figure 5: Welfare
1 and 2, as a function of ; for the case that s = 0:08: For dierent levels of s; the picture
looks qualitatively the same. We can see that prots of rm 1 decrease as rms become
more symmetric, while prots of rm 2 increase { but less so. Total prots thus decrease.
From the gure, it is hardly discernible that consumer welfare increases as rms become
more symmetric. Thus, the net eect of a decrease in  is for consumer welfare to go down,
but this eect is very small.24 Total welfare goes up as rms become more asymmetric.
This is driven by the increase in the prots of rm 1 along with savings in search and
advertising costs.25
Simulations show that the comparative statics with respect to search costs are quali-
tatively unaected by the asymmetry of advertising technologies.26 For given advertising
asymmetry ; total advertising is still increasing in search costs s: Equilibrium advertising
levels of both rms increase in s; as do prices. Prots of rm 1, the most advertising
ecient rm, are non-monotonic in s: initially they increase, but for high enough s they
decrease. The same is true for rm 2. Total welfare decreases in search costs, as does
consumer welfare.
24For this particular parametrization, total consumer welfare falls by less than 1% as  changes from 1
to 0.1. If we set search costs equal to 0.02 rather than 0.08, exactly the same is true.
25The welfare result is not only driven by the fact that rm 1 has access to a more ecient advertising
technology. In fact we obtain also a welfare gain if we introduce asymmetries by increasing rather than
decreasing the marginal cost of advertising of rm 1.
26Details are available from the authors upon request.
245 Conclusion
In this paper we modelled the idea that rms engage themselves in a battle for attention
in an attempt to being visited as early as possible in the course of search of a consumer.
Through investments in more appealing advertising, a rm can achieve a salient place
in consumer memories so that consumers will visit this rm sooner when searching for a
product they need. We modelled this in the framework of a model of search with dieren-
tiated products. In such a framework, advertising is not a winner-takes-all contest: after
a consumer has visited a rm, she may still decide to go to a dierent one if she does not
suciently like the product of the current particular rm.
We found that prices and advertising levels are increasing in consumers' search costs.
Yet, the eect on prots is ambiguous. If search costs are small to start with, then rms
are better o if search costs increase. Instead, when search costs are already high a further
increase in search costs may lower rm prots. In the latter case, getting the attention of
a consumer becomes so important that rms over-dissipate the rents generated by being
visited earlier than rival rms. This highlights the importance of looking at the interaction
of advertising and search costs, rather than only looking at search costs or advertising in
isolation. We believe this to be a general phenomenon, that applies beyond the scope of
this particular model.
Another interesting nding is that rms with more ecient advertising technologies
advertise more, charge lower prices and obtain greater prots than less ecient rivals.
Moreover, an increase in advertising cost asymmetries leads to a fall in consumer sur-
plus. Even though advertising serves to direct consumers to better deals on average, less
advertising-ecient rivals increase their prices by so much that ultimately fewer consumers
purchase a product in the market equilibrium. Asymmetries in advertising cost weaken the
advertising competition between rms. This cut in advertising outlays along with search
cost savings imply that total welfare increases.
Traditionally, persuasive advertising has been modelled as advertising that increases
a consumer's utility from buying the product. This interpretation is problematic, as it
makes it dicult to perform welfare analysis (see Bagwell, 2007). By combining saliency
25enhancing advertising and search costs, our modelling approach may provide a natural way
to think of persuasive advertising. In our model, advertising also increases demand for a
product that is heavily advertised; however, this is not because consumers derive higher
utility from advertised products but simply because they are more likely to visit shops for
which they see many ads earlier than other shops, and, hence, because search costs are
non-negligible, they are also more likely to buy from such shops. This dierence has an
implication on the relationship between prices and advertising outlays. Our model predicts
that a rm that has more persuasive advertising than its competitor, will charge a lower
price, as opposed to earlier work. Intuitively, consumers that only visit a shop because of
its persuasive ads will be more price elastic than consumers that were already interested
in the shop without seeing the ads. This price eect vanishes if both rms have the same
level of persuasive advertising.
26Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
This proof consists of four steps. First, we show that the rst-order conditions for prot
maximization indeed imply (7) and (8). Second, we show that there exists a pair (p;a)
that satises (7) and (8), and that it is unique if f0  0; a property that is also satised by
the uniform distribution. Third, we show that (p;a) is indeed a Nash equilibrium if we
restrict attention to a uniform distribution of matching values, relatively small price defec-
tions such that prots are given by (6), and suciently convex advertising cost functions.
Fourth, we show that large defections from (p;a) are never protable either.
Step 1 We rst derive the expressions (7) and (8) given in the Proposition. Maxi-
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Using these derivations and the expression for R(p) in (5) above, the rst order conditions
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28Integration by parts of (18) yields (8). To see that (17) implies (7), denote
Ck 
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which is exactly (7).
29Step 2. We now show that there exists a pair (p;a) that satises (7) and (8).
By inspection of (7), it is immediately clear that for any p there is a unique a that
accompanies p: We therefore focus on equation (8). To study the existence of a solution
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Note that the RHS of (21) is nite when p ! 0. The LHS is a positive-valued function
that decreases monotonically in p. Moreover, when p ! 0 the LHS goes to 1. Hence, for
p ! 0 the LHS is larger than the RHS. If p ! ^ x; the LHS is smaller than the RHS if and
only if 1   F(^ x) < ^ xf(^ x). Since ^ x > pm > p and by denition 1   F(pm)   pmf(pm) = 0,
concavity of monopoly prots implies that this condition always holds. With the LHS
larger that the RHS at p ! 0; but smaller at p ! ^ x; continuity implies that there must
be at least one p 2 (0; ^ x) such that (21) is satised. If also f0  0; we have that the RHS
is strictly increasing in p: With the LHS strictly increasing in p; this implies that the
solution to (21) is unique.
Step 3 In step 2, we established that there is an (a;p) that solves equations (7) and
(8). Yet, that does not immediately imply that such an (a;p) is a Nash equilibrium. For
this to be the case, we need that the payo function of a rm i is globally quasi-concave on
its domain. The domain of the payo function is the set D  f(ai;pi) 2 [0;1)  (0;pm)g
but it is convenient to split it as follows: D = D1 [ D2 [ D3 where D1  f(ai;pi) 2
(0;1)  (0;F  1(1)   ^ x + p)g, D2 = f(ai;pi) 2 [0;1)  [F  1(1)   ^ x + p;pm)g and
D3  f(ai;pi) 2 f0g(0;pmg: On the set D1; the deviating payo i(ai;pi;a;p) is given
by (6).27
Claim 1 On D1; the function i(ai;pi;a;p) is strictly concave in ai:
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)(1   F(^ x + )) + piR(pi;p
)   (ai):
Note that yn re
ects the probability that rm i will be visited given that all other rms
stick to the candidate SNE price and advertising level. Also note that
y2 =
ai
ai + a +
a
ai + aF(^ x)
27Deviations for which pi  F 1(1)   ^ x + p are special because in those situations rm i would only
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2 (1   F(^ x)) > 0:
Hence y2 is strictly increasing in ai. For y0














Note that F(^ x)yk < 1: Hence, sucient for this expression to be positive is that y0
k > 0:
But we already know that this holds for k = 2: Hence, from this expression, it also holds
for k = 3: Induction then implies that it holds for any k:

























Note that F(^ x)yk < 1: Hence, sucient for this expression to be negative is that y00
k < 0
and y0
k > 0: But we already know that this holds for k = 2: Hence, from this expression,
it also holds for k = 3: Induction then implies that it holds for any k: With y00
k+1 < 0; we
immediately have that @2()=@a2
i < 0 for any (weakly) convex function (ai):
Claim 2 On D1; the function i(ai;pi;a;p) is not necessarily quasi-concave in
pi: However, when F represents the uniform distribution, then i(ai;pi;a;p) is strictly
concave in pi:
To see that i(ai;pi;a;p) is not generally quasi-concave in pi; consider the case in
which ^ x ! 1; so search costs s go to zero). In that case our model converges to that







is quasi-concave if the density f is log-concave. However, with strictly positive search costs
(^ x < 1), our payo function equals a summation of functions of pi: This sum may not be
quasi-concave in pi, even if every summand is. In fact, if one sets ai = a above, our model
approaches that of Anderson and Renault (1999) and, as they show, with positive search
costs stronger conditions are needed for the payo to be quasi-concave (see their appendix













ai + (n   `)a ^ x
k 1 < 0;
which implies that i(ai;pi;a;p) is strictly concave in pi
Claim 3 When F is the uniform distribution, and when 00 is suciently large, the
function i(ai;pi;a;p) (dened on D1) is strictly globally concave.















We already know that @2()=@p2
i < 0 and @2()=@a2
i < 0: Therefore, it suces to




2 > 0; which holds whenever @2()=@a2
i is suciently negative.
From Claims 1,2, and 3, we conclude that there do not exist any protable deviation
in the set D1 if matching valuations are uniformly distributed and the advertising cost
function is suciently convex. To complete the proof, we now study deviations outside the
set D1:
Step 4 Consider now deviations to pairs (ai;pi) in the sets D2 and D3 dened above,
i.e., we need to make sure that a rm i has no interest in deviating by charging a price such
that 1   F(^ x + ) = 0. In that case no consumer would ever stop searching at rm i and
the deviant would only sell to the consumers who happen to nd no acceptable product







n 1f(")d"   (ai): (22)
By monotonicity, it is clear that the deviant would nd it optimal to accompany the
deviating price with an advertising eort that is vanishingly small.28 Because of log-
concavity of f, this prots expression is quasi-concave in pi (see Caplin and Nalebu,














28Likewise, notice that if the deviating rm sets an advertising eort that is vanishingly small, the rm
would be visited last and the prot expression would be similar to that in (22).































where the last equality follows from integration by parts. This expression is exactly the
limit of the rst order condition in (8) when ^ x ! 1. We will show in the proof of Proposition
2 that the expression
f(^ x)
n
1   F(^ x)n







is decreasing in ^ x. This implies that (23) is negative and therefore the prots expression in
(22) is decreasing at pi = p. This fact along with the quasi-concavity of the expression in
(22) implies that deviating prots are monotonically decreasing in pi, for all pi 2 [~ pi;pm],
with ~ pi solving 1   F(^ x + ~ pi   p) = 0. As a result, deviating to a price above p is not
protable.
Taken together, these steps establish the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 2.
1. The result on prices follows straightforwardly from the equilibrium condition on prices
(8), which does not depend on advertising costs. From the equilibrium condition on
advertising (7), we have that a change in advertising costs should leave a0(a)
constant. Consider two advertising cost functions 1 and 2; with 0
1(a) > 0
2(a) 8a;
















of 1 implies that a0
1(a) is strictly increasing in a; hence equilibrium requires a
1 < a
2:
2. (a) For the part on prices, we build on the proof of Proposition 1. The equilibrium





1   F(^ x)n







In this equation the eects of higher search costs are manifested only through
changes in ^ x. The LHS of (25) decreases in p and does not depend on ^ x.
The RHS is nondecreasing in p for any distribution that has f0  0; and this
includes the uniform. Taking the derivative of the RHS of (25) with respect to
^ x yields:
[f0(^ x)(1   F(^ x)n)   nF(^ x)n 1f2(^ x)](1   F(^ x)) + f(^ x)2(1   F(^ x)n)











(1   F(^ x))

1   F(^ x)n





The rst term is positive because of log concavity of 1 F. The second term is




F(^ x)k   F(^ x)n 1
and F is a distribution
function. We thus have that the RHS of (25) is increasing in ^ x. From (1), we
have that ^ x is decreasing in s so the result holds.














1   F(^ x)n k
n   k
:
We take the derivative of a0(a) with respect to ^ x: Recall that for a to be
increasing in s; we need it to be decreasing in ^ x: Convexity of  then implies

















From the discussion in (a) we know that dp=d^ x < 0: Therefore, if we show that









1   F n k




















1   F n k
n   k
f < 0: (29)
3. (a) Let (an;pn) be the solution to the rst order conditions (7) and (8) when the
number of rms is n. Setting n = 2 in (7) yields a20(a2) = p2(1 F(^ x))2=4 while
setting n = 3 in the same rst order condition yields a30(a3) = p3(1 F(^ x))2(4+
5F(^ x))=18: Since a0(a) is increasing in a, we have that a2 > a3 provided that
p2(1   F(^ x))2=2 > p3(1   F(^ x))2(4 + 5F(^ x))=9. For n = 2 and n = 3; it is still
possible to solve for equilibrium prices with a uniform distribution of match
values. Doing so, some particularly tedious calculations reveal that the required
inequality is indeed satised.
34(b) We nally prove that an ! 0 as n ! 1: First note that an ! 0 if and only if








It is easy to see that limn!1 pn = (1   F(^ x))=f(^ x), which is strictly positive































where the last equality follows from the fact that F(^ x)k  
1   F(^ x)n k
is strictly









k: It is known that the Euler number 
























which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3


































1   F(^ x)
:
Equation (30) shows that search costs do not aect prots directly but via price and
advertising eorts. From Proposition 2, we know that dp=d^ x < 0 and da=d^ x < 0. In
35equilibrium it is obvious that all rms gain if they all raise their prices, i.e., @=@p > 0.
This implies that an increase in search costs tends to raise prots because prices increase;
however, since @=@a =  0(a) < 0, an increase in search costs tends to lower prots
because advertising eorts go up. As a result, an increase in search costs operates on
prots in two ways that go in opposite directions.















































Consider the case where search costs are very small, that is s ! 0; which implies
















As a result the rst term in the RHS of (31) goes to 1 as s ! 0: Therefore, if the






















1   F n k
(n   k)(1   F)
f:
For linear advertising costs, this is clearly nite by the L'Hopital's rule.
2. Prots need not be increasing in search costs. Here we provide a counter-example.
Suppose match values are uniformly distributed and two rms operate in the industry.




























36where s ranges from 0 to 1=8 in this case. It is straightforward to verify that when the
advertising function is linear  is a strictly concave function reaching a maximum
at s = 0:0115631. Moreover, equilibrium prots are always lower than prots in a
frictionless world (zero search cost) as long as search cost is suciently large. 
Proof of Proposition 4





































(2   ^ x   3p
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(2   ^ x   3p
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which we can rewrite as
2
 =
4^ x   4p
1 + 6p




2   2^ x2   2
4^ x + p
1 + p
2   ^ xp





2   2^ x2   2
:
Now suppose that 2
 > 1 and p
1 > p
2: This implies that we can write p
1 = p
2 + ; for
some  > 0: Then
2
 =
4x   4(p2 + ) + 6p2   2x(p2 + ) + 4(p2 + )
2   4(p2 + )p2   2x2   2
4x + (p2 + ) + p2   x(p2 + )   xp2 + 2(p2 + )
2 + 2p2
2   4(p2 + )p2   2x2   2
:
This can only be consistent with equilibrium if the numerator is larger than the denomi-
nator, i.e.
 5(p2 + ) + 5p2   x(p2 + ) + 2(p2 + )









( x + 2 + 4p2   5) > 0




(1   x) + 2(1   p2)
But as p2 < 1=2; the right-hand side is larger than 1, which is infeasible. Hence we have
a contradiction. Thus, we have established that 






Proof of Proposition 5

























i)(1   ^ x)  
1
2
(^ x   p
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Suppose that rm 1 is the more advertising-ecient rm, so 1 < 2: From the condition






















1)(1   ^ x)  
1
2
(^ x   p




























2)(1   ^ x)  
1
2
(^ x   p



























1: But this contradicts the inequality derived above, thus establishing the result. 
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